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THE MULTI-JUDGE DECISIONAL PROCESS
ROBERT A. LEFLAR*
This brief article recapitulates what are believed to be sound prac-
tices on the part of judges of appellate courts engaged in the decision of
appealed cases. Review of lower court adjudications is of course an
appellate court's principal task, its reason for existence. Practices fol-
lowed in the course of the decisional process vary considerably from
court to court. This recapitulation, however, is in the nature of a con-
sensus, or at least a restatement, of the views of a majority of approxi-
mately one thousand appellate judges who have over the last twenty-
eight years participated in seminars discussing the subject. These were
the Appellate Judges Seminars conducted since 1956 by the Institute of
Judicial Administration at the New York University School of Law.'
This subject has been discussed, under the topic headings Administra-
tion in Appellate Courts and Preparation of Judicial Opinions, in every
seminar since the first one in 1956. The consensus, if it is that, did not
develop immediately, but rather grew over the years.2
A proper preliminary inquiry is why appeals regularly go to multi-
judge courts. The answer, almost taken for granted, derives from the
idea that two or more heads are better than one. Appeals present ulti-
mate issues, including lawmaking possibilities, and so deserve superior
handling. An odd number of judges-three or five or seven; nine may
be too many-avoids even divisions defeating decision. All relevant
considerations are more surely recognized and taken into account when
more than one person is charged with identifying and bringing them
forward. The decisional process is less hurried. The sum total of group
* Professor of Law Emeritus, New York University; Distinguished Professor of Law,
University of Arkansas; B.A. University of Arkansas; LL.B., S.J.D. Harvard University; As-
sociate Justice, Arkansas Supreme Court, 1949-50; Director and Consulting Director of Ap-
pellate Judges Seminars, New York University Law School, since 1956; author, APPELLATE
JUDICIAL OPINIONS (1974), INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES OF APPELLATE COURTS
(1976).
1. Two of these seminars, lasting two weeks each, are held each summer. The Senior
seminar is primarily for judges of state supreme courts and of the United States Courts of
Appeals, the other is for judges of state intermediate appellate courts. Some twenty to
twenty-five judges plus five or more faculty members, mostly appellate judges themselves,
make up the membership of each seminar.
2. The writer accordingly does not present these views as his own, though he agrees
with nearly all of them and has stated most of them in recent seminars and judicial
conferences.
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thought, activated by collective responsibility, is apt to be more reliable
than the thinking of single individuals in most instances.
The appellate process demands not only sound decisions but pub-
lic confidence in their soundness. Public confidence in judicial integ-
rity is part of the demand. Knowledge that multiple judges check each
other helps to sustain confidence and to protect individual judges from
public criticism. The solemn dignity of learned judges listening and
conferring together engenders public confidence.
Reasonable assurance of sound decision and public confidence in
that soundness support the multi-judge system, and by the same token,
give rise to a proper insistence that it is the duty of all the judges on a
multi-judge court to participate actively in the joint judicial enterprise
which justifies their jobs. Although the writing of a court's opinion is
customarily and almost necessarily assigned to a single judge, it is ex-
pected that all the judges on the panel that hears a case, or on the court,
if the whole bench sits on the case, take an active part both in reaching
the conclusion that decides the case and in agreeing, or disagreeing,
with the opinion that sets out the facts and reasoning which, by serving
the court's (not just the individual judge's) common-law-making func-
tion, constitute a guide to future decisions in comparable cases. If deci-
sions and opinions do not truly represent this aggregate of the judges'
views, the basic justifications for the multi-judge appellate system are
disregarded. A three-judge or seven-judge court could dispose of more
cases if single judges took complete responsibility for cases assigned to
them, but quick disposal of appeals, though having a certain value, is
far from the principal value served by the appellate process. One-judge
opinions, or opinions constituting the considered views of fewer than
the majority who purport to decide the case, violate the very reason for
the court's existence in its standard multi-judge appellate form. Sound
internal operating procedures for any appellate court must be so
planned and administered as to assure maximum compliance with
these basic purposes for which appellate courts are established.
The judges of an appellate court normally enter upon the deci-
sional process with reference to any appealed case when the briefs are
distributed to them. It should be assumed that all the judges who are to
participate in a decision have read the briefs before the case is orally
argued or submitted without argument for conference discussion. This
has not always been a common practice. Even a quarter-century ago
there were American courts in which judges were not required to read
briefs in advance, and in which some judges for one reason or another
regularly did not. Today practically all courts in this country expect
their judges to read the briefs in advance of submission, and nearly all
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judges consistently do so. Few appellate judges will admit that they do
not, even occasionally. Thus there is reasonable opportunity for intelli-
gent participation by every judge in the hearing and discussion of each
case.
Many judges, when they read the briefs in an up-coming case, then
prepare pre-argument memoranda, primarily for their own use when
the case comes up in oral argument and later conferences. It has been
suggested that copies of these memoranda be given to the other judges
as well, in advance of case submission. If the judge who wrote the
memorandum wants to pass it around, he is presumably free to do so,
but each of the other sitting judges should undertake his own study and
research, without undue reliance on other judges' memoranda. If case
memoranda are prepared by the court's central staff, however, they are
for the use of the whole court, and all the judges are entitled to see
them before the case is taken up. If a staff memorandum has little
value it can be disregarded, but whatever value it has belongs to all the
judges, to the court as an entity.
A short pre-argument conference on cases about to be orally ar-
gued, held perhaps a half-hour before oral argument begins, is stan-
dard procedure in a number of courts. It can give each judge a better
feel for the cases to be heard, can enable the court to plan each judge's
part in the hearings, and can produce a more efficient and helpful oral
argument. At the beginning of argument on each case, the Chief Jus-
tice can tell counsel what issues bother the court and can hold counsel
throughout the argument to those central issues. This practice can fa-
cilitate court control over the argument, often necessary if the argu-
ment is to be as useful as it should be. Allocation of issues for
questioning of counsel by different members of the court can be
planned. A single judge should not ask all or most of the questions
directed to counsel in any particular case. Such concentrated question-
ing creates the impression that the case already has been assigned, for-
mally or informally, to that one judge and that the other judges are
deliberately taking less interest in it. The appearance of joint judicial
concern with every case is almost as important as the actuality of group
participation and responsibility. By pre-argument agreement upon ar-
eas of questioning to be handled by different judges, the danger of a
misleading appearance of one-judge responsibility can be avoided.
Today less weight is attached to oral argument than in the past.
Some judges assert that oral presentation seldom adds to the content of
the briefs, and that when briefs are poor, the oral argument presented
by the lawyer who wrote the poor brief will be equally poor. Yet some
judges comprehend better through listening than through reading.
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Doubts that persist after briefs are read can be resolved, or with better
assurance left unresolved, after questioning at oral argument. Oral ar-
gument constitutes one of the few opportunities for public visibility in
the appellate decisional process. Public confidence in the integrity of
the process, indispensable in our tri-partite political system, is pro-
moted by this element of visibility. And sometimes there are good oral
arguments that truly further judicial understanding.
It is now generally agreed that time limits on the length of oral
argument are necessary, and that in some cases oral argument is value-
less. The length of argument may vary from case to case, though one
fairly short maximum length is appropriate for the great majority of
cases. Advance allocations of time are needed. For this purpose, some
kind of screening is required. Screening normally will be administered
by the court's staff, seldom by the judges themselves, and will involve
consultation with counsel, although counsel must not be allowed to
control the allocations. Standards for guidance of the staff in allocating
time lengths will be set by the court, usually on the basis of case com-
plexity, although the crowded state of the court's docket may have to be
the underlying consideration. Oral arguments are not as central to the
appellate decisional process as they once were, but they are still impor-
tant and likely to remain important. Courts should not disparage them
but should conduct them in such fashion as to yield a maximum of
benefit and a minimum of wasted time and effort.
A tentative decision conference usually is held as soon as possible
after the conclusion of oral arguments. If a morning is devoted to oral
arguments, that afternoon is the ideal time for the conference. The
judges have read the briefs and have heard the arguments. The issues
and contentions are fresh and clear in the minds of the whole group. If
there is a whole day or more of oral arguments, the earliest free time
that can be set apart is the best time for the conference. Too many
cases heard prior to a conference is almost as bad as a long delay; issues
and cases blur and run together in either event. When that happens,
conscientious judges must study the briefs and memoranda again in
order to be well-prepared for the decision conference. If a court hears
arguments for several days continuously, conferences ought not to be
delayed until all arguments are heard. The conferences will serve judi-
cial purposes best if periods are set aside for them at intervals during
the long hearing period. Time is saved and judgment is better when
consideration is prompt.
If there is a prompt decision conference after the case is submitted,
and there has been no pre-assignment of cases, all the judges presuma-
bly will have equal interest in each case. No judge knows that any one
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case will or will not be his case to write. Certainly, conferences should
be so conducted that every judge sitting on a case has a fair opportunity
to influence the decision.
The order in which judges state their views on cases during a con-
ference has bearing on a judge's opportunity to influence the decision.
The order might be controlled by seniority, with the Chief Justice, then
the senior judge, leading off in every case, and the junior judge speak-
ing last. That could leave junior judges only a minor role in determin-
ing results. A few courts that proceed by inverse seniority, requiring
junior judges always to lead off, apparently assume that those who
speak last are able to exert the greater influence. It would be better,
more productive of full group effectiveness in decisionmaking, if lead-
offs were rotated among all sitting judges, preferably from case to case
and at least from day to day. Whatever the order, it ought to be varied.
For similar reasons, the vote on how the case is to be decided should
not come as the judges state their views on the case. A statement of
views and reasons may of course indicate how the judge expects to
vote, but no judge should commit a final vote before hearing the rea-
soned analyses of every one of the sitting judges. Those first to speak
should leave themselves free to change their minds. It should be possi-
ble for all views to have effect upon each judge's vote.
The vote taken at this conference may not be the final one. Be-
cause the judge to whom the case will be assigned for preparation of
the court's opinion has not yet done the research upon which the opin-
ion must be based, the vote must be tentative. Almost always, the ten-
tative vote will stand, but the exceptional case will still turn up.
The system employed for assigning cases is of first importance.
Several different methods of assignment are currently used. Assign-
ment by some kind of rotation prior to argument and submission is still
the practice in some courts, but it is increasingly believed that this is
undesirable. Pre-assigned judges, knowing which cases will be theirs
for writing opinions, almost certainly will spend more time on their
own cases, from the beginning, than on the others. They will be better
prepared than the other judges to ask questions of counsel during oral
argument, thus enabling counsel to guess which judge has the case.
The pre-assigned judge, by leading off in conference discussion of his
case, can exert major influence in deciding it, since the other judges,
each concentrating on his own cases, will be less prepared on all cases.
The pre-assignment system does not lead inevitably to one-judge deci-
sions, but it leans in that direction.
A check-judge device, used in some courts that pre-assign cases,
minimizes the system's faults at least slightly. A second judge is pre-
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assigned to each case, not with responsibility for the ultimate opinion
but rather to check on the first judge's understanding of the facts and
analysis of the law. In a sense this tends toward two-judge decisions.
In most courts cases are not assigned to individual judges until
after the tentative decision is made in conference. All judges thus pre-
sumably remain equally involved with all the cases because they do not
know which ones will later be assigned to them. And the subsequently
assigned judge knows the views of all his colleagues before he settles
down for his final research and preparation of the court's opinion.
Subsequent assignment by the Chief Justice or by the senior judge
in the majority has been the most common method of post-conference
assignment. This can produce a fair distribution of the work and can
take account of the special interests, including the possible expertise, of
particular judges. Some courts, however, prefer a more impersonal
system.
Assignment of cases by lot after tentative decisions are reached is a
possibility. A few courts do this, in one way or another. One way, not
much favored, is to let the judges themselves, in an order determined
by lot, select their cases. The judge who draws first might take what
appears to be the easiest case, or the one that he finds most interesting,
and so on down to the judge who drew the last choice. He takes what is
left, which might be the most difficult case. On the next drawing, after
the next decision conference, he might do better.
A more acceptable method of post-conference assignment by lot is
now employed in a number of states. Under it the cases are given their
numbers in advance, and the judges draw for the same numbers. By
this method the assignment is altogether by chance and completely im-
partial, so that there is no opportunity for exercise of individual prefer-
ences on any basis, and the potentiality for one-judge opinions
attributable to a judge's special expertise or special interest is reduced
to a minimum. This may well be the fairest of all the appellate case
assignment procedures in current use.
The writing of opinions is probably not an appellate judge's most
important work, but it is the work which, more often than not, has most
to do with his public reputation. He has to take it seriously, and usu-
ally he does.
The court's tentative decision has been made before he starts to
write. He is aware of the views expressed in conference by his fellow
judges. He knows that his assignment is to write an opinion for the
whole court, or its majority, and not just for himself, though he does
not want to be put in the position of dissenting from his own opinion.
He is entitled to employ his own writing style and his own jurispruden-
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tial concepts, but he needs to refer to divergent concurring reasons ex-
pressed by other judges so that they will not find it necessary to write
separate opinions.
He knows that if his case is a difficult one his colleagues are rely-
ing on him to do the further research and analysis that may raise
doubts about the tentative decision in which he concurred. If this hap-
pens, he may conclude that the case should be discussed again in con-
ference before he writes, or he may decide to write it tentatively and let
his writing introduce the new research for discussion at the subsequent
conference.
There is no good reason why the writing judge should not be free
to talk with his colleagues about his opinion as he writes it. Often he
will not, because writing is a one-person job. The writing should be
done as soon as possible after the conference, while the writer can still
remember what the other judges' views were. He may choose to check
with other judges as he writes to make sure that he understands their
views, perhaps to the extent of showing them drafts of relevant
paragraphs and asking, "Does this adequately take account of your
views on that point?" A draft can be revised before it is seen by all the
judges. The multi-judge character of the decisional process does not
end with the conference vote to affirm, reverse, or whatever, but ex-
tends to and includes the language of the opinion. That too may have
precedential effect. Even dictum sometimes influences future decisions.
The fact that the writing judge puts his name on the opinion does not
relieve the court as an entity of its responsbility, nor does that relieve
the writing judge of his duty to make the opinion the court's collective
statement.
No piece of writing can become a court's opinion until it has been
formally approved by the members of the court as a group, or by the
required majority. Normally this approval will come at an opinion
conference held shortly before opinions are due to be released. Opin-
ion conferences could be a dull and time-consuming chore, but need
not be. Drafts of opinions should be circulated to all the judges before
the conference so that every judge has a fair opportunity to call the
writer's attention, either orally or in writing (which may be more help-
ful), to mistakes and to changes that might improve the opinion. If
these turn out to be substantial and the author accepts them, the opin-
ion would be recopied and recirculated in corrected form before it is
formally submitted at conference. If opinions have been circulated in
essentially final form at least a day before the conference, so that all the
judges are currently acquainted with them, there will be no need to
read or discuss them except in reference to disagreements and minor
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changes. Most opinions can be approved summarily or, if not ap-
proved, can be held over for revision and resubmission. Announce-
ment of intent to write concurrences or dissents would be made at that
time.
It is possible that the equivalent of an opinion conference can be
conducted by correspondence or by telephone, perhaps by conference
call. This may be necessary in courts whose judges do not all have
offices together. Spontaneous exchange of views and mutual under-
standings may ensue more easily from personal conversations and from
serious but friendly discussion around a table. The important thing is
that no opinion ever be issued save after group consideration of it and
agreement to its issuance. Some kind of an opinion conference, culmi-
nating in whatever agreement can be arrived at, is essential to the exer-
cise of the collective responsibility that is required by the very nature of
multi-judge appellate courts.
Special problems inevitably arise if the court is one that sits in
separate panels, usually with three judges per panel. The whole court
may consist of fifteen or even thirty or more judges. When a case is
decided and an opinion issued by a three-judge panel, or by a two-to-
one majority of the panel, it constitutes something more than the judg-
ment of the panel; it is in some way a judgment of the whole court of
which the panel is only a fractional part. Another panel might have
reached a different result. Should another panel faced with a similar
case a month or a year later be free to reach a different result? Should
there be some procedure for committing, or at least alerting, the whole
court to a panel's decision and opinion, before it becomes final?
One possibility of course is that the losing party may ask for an en
banc review of the case. If the total membership of the court is no
more than nine, or even eleven, an en banc hearing can be held, and
many smaller multi-panel courts do hold them. If there is more than
that number of judges on the whole court, however, en banc hearings
will seldom if ever be held, nor can they be. A large court might estab-
lish a review system under which seven or nine judges specially se-
lected from its total membership could rehear such cases, but few
multi-panel courts do this. Probably they should. Precedents from that
body could then be binding on the whole court.
Alternative devices, though helpful, seem less satisfactory. The
principal one is to treat the decision first announced as a binding prece-
dent for the whole court regardless of possible later disagreement with
it by other panels. Several intermediate courts do that. Dangers inher-
ent in this approach can be minimized by requiring that, before any
panel opinion is released, it be circulated to all the judges on the entire
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court under an arrangement by which other judges may within a speci-
fied short time report their objections to it with requests that the origi-
nal panel reconsider its position. The panel would not be bound to do
so, but could. This arrangement at least would give all the judges some
opportunity for input into the original panel's ultimately authoritative
precedential decision.
A companion technique employed in many multi-panel courts
calls for rotation of membership on panels, so that every judge within
each fixed time period - six months or a year - will sit on a panel
with every other judge on the court. That prevents persistently unique
legal attitudes that might develop in permanently separate panels. The
combination of rotation in panel memberships with advance circula-
tion of all opinions to other-panel judges can reasonably justify the
practice of treating the first announced panel decision as precedent for
the whole court. Thus guarded, the practice is preferable to the other
alternative, of later panels being free to disregard the first decision as
though it came from a different court.
Motions for rehearing, apart from motions for en banc hearings, in
most courts are freely allowed, seldom granted, and ordinarily looked
upon with a kind of judicial disdain. A reason for this situation is that
attorneys most often do not file them with any real expectation of re-
versing a court's already considered judgment, but rather to gain delay
in the judgment's finality and to give clients a little more time to accept
the fact that their case has been lost. Court rules could well be more
hardboiled in not allowing such motions to be filed unless real grounds
for reconsideration are asserted in good faith. Some courts follow a
practice of leaving it to the judge who wrote the attacked opinion to
recommend to the court what action it should take on the motion. That
seems wrong. A different judge or judges should make the recommen-
dation, presumably after consulting with the writing judge. This would
not be an undue burden if the mass of baseless motions were elimi-
nated. One of the real advantages of motions for rehearing, however, is
to focus the court's attention on erroneous or careless statements in an
opinion while there is still time to correct the language before it
becomes final. Judges should have an opportunity to correct their er-
rors before they become the law.
Finally, every court would be helped in conducting its decisional
processes if all the details of those processes were fixed and publicly
known. In several courts these procedures, having first been definitely
agreed upon, are published in pamphlets available to the bar and the
general public. This enables the judges themselves, especially new
judges, and the bar and interested citizens, including litigants, to know
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what the procedures are. This can add to any court's effectiveness by
assuring added public confidence in the court's collegial responsibility
and integrity. The public can know through the published procedures
that the court does operate as a court and not as a collection of one-
judge decisionmakers.
